Throughout the fall of 2004, police continued their intense search for BTK, this time looking to their own ranks. BTK is believed to have what some might consider "inside knowledge" of police activity or law enforcement training. For practical reasons, many serial killers are focused on the investigation into their crimes. Some, like the notorious South Carolina serial killer, Pee Wee Gaskins, and Dr. Frank Sweeney, Cleveland's Kingsbury Run murderer, have even cultivated police sources by hanging around taverns where cops visit and luring them into conversations about the investigation.
Serial killers are also attracted to law enforcement because it represents power, the ingredient that the serial killer lacks in his everyday life. Kenneth Bianchi, one of the Hillside Stranglers, took courses in police science and posed as a psychologist so that he could pal around with investigators working on his case. It was more than just a practical activity to avoid becoming a suspect himself, it was the vicarious thrill of outsmarting the police and exerting power over them.
Dr. Frank Sweeney did the same type of thing while decapitating 13 or more victims in the 1930s. The famed Eliot Ness was head of law enforcement in Cleveland at that time. When Eliot Ness focused his attentions on Sweeney, Sweeney reciprocated by sending Ness taunting post cards and even a papier maché torso. Sweeney got tremendous pleasure from outsmarting the very smart Eliot Ness.
This is what is happening here with BTK. Instead of exerting power over his victims as he tortured and killed them a couple of decades ago, he is now exerting power over the police. His games, his letters, his packages are putting enormous pressure on them to produce an arrest. Not only that, BTK has found a way to hold power over thousands of fascinated amateur sleuths who flock to the chat rooms and message boards to theorize and analyze BTK's every word. With the Laci Peterson circus finally coming to a close, BTK is making a bid to be the next televised obsession. He has become a celebrity.
Was BTK ever a Wichita cop? It's not likely, although he may have experience in the military police. Just to be on the safe side in case BTK turns out to be another Gerard Schafer, Wichita police called on retired police officers in mid-November to volunteer to have the inside of their mouths swabbed for DNA samples so they could be eliminated as potential suspects. However, investigators ran into unexpected difficulty when at least one police officer refused to participate in the ongoing investigation.
According to Roy Wenzl's November 21, 2004 article in the Wichita Eagle, retired Det. Frank Cummins was skeptical of the DNA tests because of long-term privacy concerns. Wenzl reported that "because of the nature of DNA, because it can show genetic family relationships, it would be like handing the police department a permanent set of fingerprints, without permission from every person genetically related to him." Moreover, Cummins believed that the tests were a waste of money and he distrusted how the police would utilize the samples. Consequently, he decided not to voluntarily provide DNA samples. He would not be the last person to refuse police testing.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Friday, December 25, 2009
photos 3.pho.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Claire and Dora Williamson had received a copy of Fasting for the Cure of Disease, Hazzard's publication. It purported to have resulted in remarkable recoveries for people who had found little help elsewhere. Hazzard was a natural salesperson who had spread her ideas to an international audience. She had published testimonials from success stories, and the sisters were impressed. A fan of natural cures, they checked in for the treatment on February 27, 1911.
They did not realize that, once there, they would not be able to just leave. In fact, they would be too weak to do so. They agreed to undergo the rigorous fasting, shedding weight to the point where they were nearly mere skeletons. As they grew weaker, Olson points out, they became more committed to the therapy. Suffering was a sign, they were told, that the treatment was working. Even when they became bedridden after two months, the doctor would not allow them to eat. At the same time, she secured their jewelry and land deeds, to "prevent others" from coming into their apartment to rob them. Then she moved them to her newly completed sanitarium, where they could communicate with no one. At that time, they weighed around 75 pounds each and were often delirious.
Claire managed to secretly find someone to send a telegram, but she eventually died, even as Margaret Convey, a faithful nanny, rushed there from Australia. Convey rescued Dora, now said to be insane, before she met the same fate. Dora had been on the treatment for four months, but with Convey's help, she regained her health and proved to be an effective witness—especially photos of her during the latter stage of the fasting cure--when the case came to trial in 1912—as murder. Hazzard was found guilty of manslaughter. The medical establishment removed her license during the legal proceedings, and she claimed that the verdict was just part of the persecution she had suffered all along. The Town Crier wrote that her gender had saved her from the verdict of murder.
During her appeal, two women and two babies died at her center. She spent only two years in prison, and in exchange for her leaving the country, the governor granted a pardon. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire, went to New Zealand, but eventually returned to Olalla, writes Iserson, and resumed her treatments. Arrested again when another man died, she was fined for violating medical practice. Since she kept no records, the number of people who died (or were intentionally starved to death) under her "care" cannot be estimated.
Oddly enough, Dr. Hazzard's book is available today on several Webs sites that tout her treatment as scientific and effective, but the Skeptical Inquirer assures readers that the claims Hazzard made for its health benefits are both vacuous and bogus.
They did not realize that, once there, they would not be able to just leave. In fact, they would be too weak to do so. They agreed to undergo the rigorous fasting, shedding weight to the point where they were nearly mere skeletons. As they grew weaker, Olson points out, they became more committed to the therapy. Suffering was a sign, they were told, that the treatment was working. Even when they became bedridden after two months, the doctor would not allow them to eat. At the same time, she secured their jewelry and land deeds, to "prevent others" from coming into their apartment to rob them. Then she moved them to her newly completed sanitarium, where they could communicate with no one. At that time, they weighed around 75 pounds each and were often delirious.
Claire managed to secretly find someone to send a telegram, but she eventually died, even as Margaret Convey, a faithful nanny, rushed there from Australia. Convey rescued Dora, now said to be insane, before she met the same fate. Dora had been on the treatment for four months, but with Convey's help, she regained her health and proved to be an effective witness—especially photos of her during the latter stage of the fasting cure--when the case came to trial in 1912—as murder. Hazzard was found guilty of manslaughter. The medical establishment removed her license during the legal proceedings, and she claimed that the verdict was just part of the persecution she had suffered all along. The Town Crier wrote that her gender had saved her from the verdict of murder.
During her appeal, two women and two babies died at her center. She spent only two years in prison, and in exchange for her leaving the country, the governor granted a pardon. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire, went to New Zealand, but eventually returned to Olalla, writes Iserson, and resumed her treatments. Arrested again when another man died, she was fined for violating medical practice. Since she kept no records, the number of people who died (or were intentionally starved to death) under her "care" cannot be estimated.
Oddly enough, Dr. Hazzard's book is available today on several Webs sites that tout her treatment as scientific and effective, but the Skeptical Inquirer assures readers that the claims Hazzard made for its health benefits are both vacuous and bogus.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
described 0.des.9992 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The Frankford Curse
On June 20, Leonard Christopher was ordered to stand trial for the Dowd murder, since the evidence was deemed sufficient. Two women who knew him said they had seen him that night. One, Emma Leigh, said that he had walked into the alley behind the fish store around 1:00 A.M., and she heard a woman scream. She left with a man in a car (Newton says a date, the paper indicates it was a client picking her up), so she did not witness any other event. Linda Washington, the second woman, claimed to have seen Christopher leave the alley carrying his shirt over his arm and sporting a knife in a sheath hanging around his waist.
Christopher's defense attorney, Jack McMahon, stated that the witnesses had contradicted each other and their testimony would not stand up in court. Neither would the robbery charge, because Dowd's purse, while open, still had cash in it. It might simply have been dropped during the attack.
Defense Attorney Jack McMahon
Defense Attorney Jack McMahon
Despite the fact that the suspect had not been proven guilty, the residents of the Frankford Avenue area were relieved to know that someone had been caught. They felt certain that their neighborhood could return to normal. They were wrong.
Christopher, jailed without bond, was safely locked away on September 6, 1990, when Michelle Dehner was found murdered (Newton calls her Michelle Martin, as do later newspaper reports). She was 30 and lived in a fourth-floor efficiency apartment on Arrott Street, not far from Frankford Avenue. Once a suspect in the Durkin murder for having fought over a blanket, she was now officially off the suspect list. She was a victim.
The police, called to the scene that Saturday afternoon, found her lying on the floor. She had been stabbed 23 times in the chest and stomach. Once again, it appeared to be the work of the Frankford Slasher. There was no sign of forced entry, as was the case with the other indoor assaults, and no obvious murder weapon found at the scene or discarded nearby. This murder scene was only three blocks from where Carol Dowd had been killed, and it was on the same street as the 1989 murder of Theresa Sciortino.
Dehner/Martin was described in the Inquirer as a hard-drinking, paranoid loner, and was even called "Crazy Michelle" by people in the neighborhood. She was considered somewhat unconventional, sometimes barricading herself into her apartment and other times just tossing things out the window, no matter who might be standing below. Single and hard-edged, she frequented the same bars where the previous murder victims had often gone. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire A large blonde, she was often seen in sloppy sweatshirts and jeans, and spent her time wandering from one bar to the next. Sometimes she sold soft pretzels on the street, but usually she just drank all day. Neighbors indicated to reporters that she was not very friendly, and one person said that she did not often bathe. A day and a half before her death, she had left the bar with a white man (Newton says this was on the evening of September 6, but that's the day she was found murdered). In fact, people had seen her bring men home on several occasions.
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* Print
On June 20, Leonard Christopher was ordered to stand trial for the Dowd murder, since the evidence was deemed sufficient. Two women who knew him said they had seen him that night. One, Emma Leigh, said that he had walked into the alley behind the fish store around 1:00 A.M., and she heard a woman scream. She left with a man in a car (Newton says a date, the paper indicates it was a client picking her up), so she did not witness any other event. Linda Washington, the second woman, claimed to have seen Christopher leave the alley carrying his shirt over his arm and sporting a knife in a sheath hanging around his waist.
Christopher's defense attorney, Jack McMahon, stated that the witnesses had contradicted each other and their testimony would not stand up in court. Neither would the robbery charge, because Dowd's purse, while open, still had cash in it. It might simply have been dropped during the attack.
Defense Attorney Jack McMahon
Defense Attorney Jack McMahon
Despite the fact that the suspect had not been proven guilty, the residents of the Frankford Avenue area were relieved to know that someone had been caught. They felt certain that their neighborhood could return to normal. They were wrong.
Christopher, jailed without bond, was safely locked away on September 6, 1990, when Michelle Dehner was found murdered (Newton calls her Michelle Martin, as do later newspaper reports). She was 30 and lived in a fourth-floor efficiency apartment on Arrott Street, not far from Frankford Avenue. Once a suspect in the Durkin murder for having fought over a blanket, she was now officially off the suspect list. She was a victim.
The police, called to the scene that Saturday afternoon, found her lying on the floor. She had been stabbed 23 times in the chest and stomach. Once again, it appeared to be the work of the Frankford Slasher. There was no sign of forced entry, as was the case with the other indoor assaults, and no obvious murder weapon found at the scene or discarded nearby. This murder scene was only three blocks from where Carol Dowd had been killed, and it was on the same street as the 1989 murder of Theresa Sciortino.
Dehner/Martin was described in the Inquirer as a hard-drinking, paranoid loner, and was even called "Crazy Michelle" by people in the neighborhood. She was considered somewhat unconventional, sometimes barricading herself into her apartment and other times just tossing things out the window, no matter who might be standing below. Single and hard-edged, she frequented the same bars where the previous murder victims had often gone. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire A large blonde, she was often seen in sloppy sweatshirts and jeans, and spent her time wandering from one bar to the next. Sometimes she sold soft pretzels on the street, but usually she just drank all day. Neighbors indicated to reporters that she was not very friendly, and one person said that she did not often bathe. A day and a half before her death, she had left the bar with a white man (Newton says this was on the evening of September 6, but that's the day she was found murdered). In fact, people had seen her bring men home on several occasions.
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Thursday, July 30, 2009
Mr. Ishizawa 4.rr. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
299. Japan Plans to Convert Its Frozen Funds.
Mr. Ishizawa again urged Tokyo on August 4, 1941 to buy materials from the Netherlands East Indies with Japanese funds available in Batavia. Since the attitude of the Dutch authorities had grown more hostile toward Japan because of the occupation of French Indo-China and the Japanese threat of moving into Thailand, he reiterated that speedy measures should be taken to procure the immediate export of vital materials. [1132] In view of the fact that the Japanese retaliatory order froze both the funds and the assets of the Netherlands, Mr. Ishizawa expected the Dutch to take even more drastic steps in return. He suggested, therefore, that the guilder funds be released without delay to be applied as payment for exports to Japan. Furthermore, Tokyo was requested to inform Ambassador Pabst that the Japanese order as well as the Netherlands measure, was to freeze only the funds, not the assets, of the other country. [1133] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although the freezing regulations of both countries were comprehensive measures, having no bearing on individual cases, nevertheless, on August 4, 1941 the Netherlands government filed a special request for the transfer of 500,000 yen Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire to the managers of the guild's branches in Japan. In order to preclude the Dutch from retaliating against Japanese banks in the Netherlands Indies, Mr. Ishizawa advised Tokyo to comply with their wishes regarding this transfer. Thus, in the future, when Japan was attempting the conversion of her frozen funds into exportable goods, such action would furnish a precedent for the Netherlands officials. [1134]
[1129] II, 1120.
[1130] II, 1121.
[1131] II, 1122.
[1132] II, Ibid.
[1133] II, 1123.
[1134] II, 1124.
203
PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(k) Japanese‑Thaiese Relations.
300. Japanese Intelligence Reports on Thailand.
On May 23, 1941 Tokyo was informed that Chinese residents in Thailand were still pro-American and pro‑British. For this reason, Mr. Shunsuke Asada, a Japanese Consul General in Bangkok, and the first secretary of the Japanese Legation in Thailand, advised Tokyo to send men acting as business agents, rather than representatives from the Nanking government, on a tour of inspection to win over the Thaiese. [1135]
301. Japan Attempts to Acquire Most of Thailand's Exports.
Since Japan was interested in Thailand's resources, reports in connection with Japan's prospects for acquiring various Thaiese mines were sent to Tokyo. [1136] On June 6, 1941 Mr. Asada suggested that inactive rice refineries belonging to Chinese operators be purchased with the view of forming a guild to secure a comprehensive export permit. This would be a means of reconciling the Chinese dealers in Thailand who would be allowed to do business with Chinese within Japanese occupied territories. [1137]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka on June 9, 1941 inquired as to Thailand's views concerning the subsidizing by Japan of a jointly‑managed Thai‑Japanese company which would ensure regular uninterrupted shipments of tin to Japan. [1138] Mr. Matsuoka was also maneuvering to obtain most of the tin ore mined in Thailand, and, with this in view, was attempting to purchase a two‑months' prospecting contract, with an arrangement that all the tin ore mined during that time would be sent to Japan. [1139]
Since it was necessary that Japan obtain guarantees for three staples, tungsten, tin, and rubber, Mr. Asada suggested on June 6, 1941 that the Mitsui organization, which was currently negotiating for the purchase of tin mines in Thailand, be encouraged by the Foreign Office to obtain an option for these mines. [1140]
302. Japan Sends Oil Experts to Thailand in Guise of Diplomats.
To investigate the current consumption of petroleum in Thailand, a member of the Japanese Government Planning Board, Juro Suzuki, and an official of the Fuel Bureau, Yosio Yosida, were sent in early June, 1941 to Bangkok with the official titles of Foreign Office Secretary and General Affairs Official. These men were also to instruct secretly other Japanese in the methods of petroleum consumption. However, Japan was uncertain as to Thailand's reception of its "experts" and directed Mr. Yasusato Futami, Japanese Minister to Thailand, to sound out Thaiese officials in this matter. [1141]
[1135] II, 1125.
[1136] II, 1126.
[1137] II, 1127.
[1138] II, 1128.
[1139] II, 1129.
[1140] II, 1130‑1131.
[1141] II, 1132.
204
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
303. Japanese‑Thaiese Petroleum Negotiations.
As for petroleum, on June 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed to supply the amount needed by Thailand, but declared that in the future Japan would demand the entire amount of Thaiese rubber and tin. Japan would agree to British‑Thailand petroleum negotiations only if these were on a small scale, and if Thailand would furnish Japan with as much as possible of 15,000 tons of tin ore a year. It was Japan's intention at this time to secure forty per cent of Thailand's tin production, and eventually the entire output. The amount of petroleum to be supplied by Japan for the month of June, 1941 would be decided later in view of the British. [1142]
304. Britain Supplies Oil to Thailand.
It was confidentially reported to Tokyo on June 6, 1941 that Great Britain had decided to furnish 6,000 tons of petroleum to Thailand. [1143] However, since business was suspended at this time, the British supply would be accepted by the Asia Petroleum Company and later reloaded. [1144]
Despite a Japanese decision that all matters pertaining to the supplying of petroleum to Thailand should be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, Mr. Matsuoka informed Minister Futami that Thailand had submitted a request to the Japanese navy for 12,000 tons of crude oil. The Thaiese government was to be advised that such requests, when not submitted to the Foreign Office, would not be considered by Japan. [1145]
305. Japan Mediates a Thailand‑French Indo-China Dispute.
In January, 1941 Japan had offered to mediate hostilities between Thailand and French Indo-China concerning the cessation of border territories, which Thailand had demanded. After several prolongations of the armistice, an agreement was signed in Tokyo on March 11, 1941, and later a treaty and two protocols were drafted. France was to cede some 25,000 miles of territory in French Indo-China, including the districts of Paklay and Bassac, and a large part of Cambodia, which were to be demilitarized.
During the negotiations for the ratification of the treaty, Japan asked on June 13, 1941 that Luang Songram Pibul, Prime Minister of Thailand, send Nai Pananow Wanitto, Chief of the Thaiese Trade Bureau, to Japan to assist the Foreign Office. [1146] As soon as Mr. Andre Roban, the French Plenipotentiary in French Indo-China, returned to his post, proceedings were to begin, [1147] since Thailand was anxious to have the ratification take place by June 27, 1941 at the very latest. [1148] The mediation treaty was to be presented to the Japanese Privy Council in Tokyo on June 18, 1941. Eventually, the Thailand‑French Indo-China treaty was signed on June 21, 1941 and the exchange of official documents was scheduled to take place on July 1, 1941. [1149]
[1142] II, 1130‑1131.
[1143] II, 1133.
[1144] II, 1134.
[1145] II, 1135.
[1146] II, 1136.
[1147] II, 1137.
[1148] II, 1138.
[1149] II, 1139.
205
306. Thailand Desires Continuation of Japanese Pressure on French Indo-China.
In a conversation with Mr. Futami a few days before the ratification by the French took place, Minister Pibul of Thailand had remarked that he would like to ascertain the Japanese attitude toward French Indo-China. Though he had assured the Prime Minister that there would be no change in the future policy of the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister believed that Mr. Pibul still was concerned lest Japan would weaken in exerting pressure on French Indo-China, and especially in its independent attitude toward Britain. However, on July 11, 1941 Mr. Futami informed Tokyo that the Prime Minister of Thailand, in a conversation with the Italian Minister, had raised a question as to why Japan did not advance to the north, since the pressure on the south had been alleviated. [1150]
307. Details of Japanese‑Thaiese Agreement.
Mr. Futami also reported that both Ambassador Hajime Matsumiya's proposal regarding political and economical cooperation between Japan and Thailand, and the understanding between Itaro Mizuno, of the Commercial Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and Nai Wanitto, Acting Minister of Finance of Thailand, urged that economic problems be submitted for consideration by the various firms engaged in the business concerned. However, political problems still seemed to be under the jurisdiction of Nai Wanitto. [1151]
308. Japanese Interest in Survey of Thailand's Border.
On June 20, 1941 Mr. Futami inquired of Tokyo regarding the organization by Thailand of five scientific groups, two of which were being formed for land survey, one for meteorological observation, and two for surveying the Mekong and Mei Rivers. Suggesting an increase in Japanese representation in the groups, Mr. Futami asked for a declaration of policy in order that he might negotiate the matter with the Thaiese government. [1152]
309. Japanese Propaganda Activities in Thailand.
Plans were under way to establish a Japanese printing office in Bangkok, [1153] and 4,400 baht (Thaiese monetary unit) had been appropriated from secret intelligence funds for purchasing the Bangkok Chronicle. [1154] The proposed visit of the editor of the Bangkok Chronicle to Japan was viewed with suspicion by Minister Futami in a report of July 3, 1941, since the Japanese Minister felt that the editor was making the trip to collect information for the local British Minister from whom he had received 5,000 bahts. While admitting that the accuracy of this report was questionable, Minister Futami advised that great care should be exercised. [1155]
As to the purchase of the Bangkok Chronicle, Mr. Futami pointed out that the paper had only a very small circulation and not much influence among the Thaiese. As an organ of propaganda, the paper's effectiveness was uncertain. Furthermore, it would be necessary to study carefully the means and methods of controlling the news in the paper as well as supervising its editorial policy. [1156]
[1150] II, 1140.
[1151] II, 1141‑1142.
[1152] II, 1143.
[1153] II, 1144.
[1154] II, 1145‑1146.
[1155] II, 1147.
[1156] II, 1148.
206
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
310. British Opposition to Japanese Control of Thailand's Exports.
In a dispatch to Tokyo on June 23, 1941 Mr. Futami revealed that the British had suggested to Thailand that the amount of rubber to be furnished to Japan should be reduced to 25,000 tons a year. Although he had no intention of considering this proposal, Prime Minister Pibul had asked Minister Futami whether the Japanese government could be satisfied with 35,000 tons yearly.
Mr. Wanitto informed the Japanese Minister on June 21, 1941 that the British had no objection to Japan's having up to 2,000 tons of tin ore, to which Mr. Futami had replied that this would not be half the amount which Japan needed. Reference was also made at this time to the establishment of tin refining plants, but there was no indication of Thailand's making any definite proposal. Mr. Wanitto pointed out that, considering the nature of the tin industry in Thailand and the fact that the ore was secured from tin mines affiliated with British capital, there would be opposition to a joint Japanese‑Thaiese organization. [1157] Reports concerning the purchases of Thailand rubber by Germany, Britain and the United States continued to disturb Tokyo which desired these exports for its own use. [1158]
311. Estimated Value of Japanese‑Thaiese Exports.
Referring to previous Japanese‑Thaiese economic agreements, Mr. Futami estimated that according to the Japanese plan, Japanese products worth 130,000,000 yen would be exported to Thailand whereas Thailand's exports to Japan would reach the enormous sum of 208,000,000 yen. In view of this prospective unfavorable balance of trade, the Japanese Minister advised that Tokyo consider carefully how Japan would pay for all of these products. [1159]
312. British‑Thaiese Economic Agreement.
A resume of the prospective British‑Thailand agreement was sent to Tokyo on July 14, 1941. The minimum quantity of rubber to be sent to England was 18,000 tons, and although up to 30,000 tons in addition could be supplied, in no event was a total of 48,000 tons to be exceeded. In return, the Thailand government agreed not to use for re‑exportation any of the petroleum furnished by Britain. [1160] Although Britain had requested the Thailand government to withdraw the currency it now had in America, no definite conclusion had been reached.
313. Japan Fears British Influence in Thailand.
Although at the time of the Wanitto conversations in Tokyo, the Thaiese people had started celebrations and demonstrations, Minister Futami reported on July 12, 1941 that this excitement had abated. Because of the resumption of relations with Great Britain, Japan feared that Thailand would revive her principle of good will for all nations, and as a result, the relations between Japan and Thailand would suffer a setback. Mr. Futami pointed out that when Mr. Wanitto had first returned from Tokyo, Thaiese authorities had expected Japan to seize Singapore in the near future. But since that time, Thailand's offer of rubber to Japan had decreased in size from 38,400 tons to 30,000. [1161]
[1157] II, 1142.
[1158] II, 1149‑1151.
[1159] II, 1152.
[1160] II, 1153.
[1161] II, 1154.
207
314. American ‑Thaiese Proposals.
Minister Futami reported that Thailand had proposed to America that payment for its orders for several American‑made freighters and bombers, as well as the oil purchased from Britain, be made from funds Thailand had in America. In considering this proposal, the American government had in turn requested that Thailand not exclude Christianity, form no secret foreign trade agreement with a third country, and exchange intelligence with the United States. However, the American request had not been accepted by July 15, 1941. [1162]
315. Japan Plans to Offset British Influence.
Fearing that Thailand might resume her talks with Great Britain, Japan proposed to organize immediately a Japanese‑Thaiese commission. Mr. Futami was asked on July 16, 1941 to negotiate personally with Mr. Pibul with the view of working out a prospectus for joint Japanese‑Thaiese rights and interests. The Japanese commission was to consist of Mr. Futami as Chairman, the Military and Naval Attaches, and two first‑class diplomatic secretaries. Tokyo requested that Minister Pibul be made the chief Thailand negotiator, or that someone else amenable to Japanese influence be appointed. [1163]
316. Japan Expands Its Communications System in Thailand.
In conjunction with the Japanese policy of preparing communications facilities for use in case of emergency, Japanese representatives inquired on May 16, 1941 concerning the possibility of placing a radio transmitter in the consulate at Singora, [1164] but Tokyo decided at this time that the establishment of two‑way radio communication with Canton was impracticable from the viewpoint of secrecy. [1165] However, on July 21, 1941 negotiations for the expansion of Japanese communication were under way with the Thailand Communications Bureau. [1166]
317. Japan Informs Thailand of the Japanese‑French Agreement.
Realizing that Thailand would be concerned as to the purpose of the Japanese‑French Joint Agreement, Japan informed its Minister at Bangkok concerning the negotiations at Vichy. Prime Minister Pibul was to be informed of the agreement at 6:00 P.M. on July 24, 1941, two days prior to the publication of a statement announcing the agreement on July 26, 1941.
Because the people of Thailand would be very much affected by the publishing of the Japanese-French Joint Agreement, Japan felt that the significance of the pact should be minimized as much as possible by Prime Minister Pibul, who was to be assured that the joint understanding was not aimed at Thailand, and that the traditional friendship between Bangkok and Tokyo would not be affected. Furthermore, Japan had not lost its eagerness to cooperate in the economic development of Thailand, for it was giving Mr. Pibul advance information concerning the Japanese‑French Agreement as an indication of the intimacy of Japanese‑Thaiese relations. [1167]
According to Mr. Futami's report of his interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Pibul expressed his deep appreciation at being privately informed of the Japanese‑French Agreement, which was acceptable to him, but had showed no surprise upon hearing the news. [1168]
[1162] II, 1155.
[1163] II, 1156.
[1164] II, 1157.
[1165] II, 1158.
[1166] II, 1159.
[1167] II, 1160.
[1168] II, 1161.
208
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
318. Japan Decides Not to Stop British‑Thaiese Agreement.
On July 26, 1941 it was learned that Britain had agreed to supply Thailand with petroleum in return for rubber, tin, and other products, and, thus, Japan's demands upon Thailand could not be carried out. If Japan insisted on the accomplishment of her original demands, however, it would be impossible for the British‑Thaiese negotiations to go through, and this would result in Thailand's calling on Japan for all of her requirements. For this reason Minister Futami thought it advisable not to hamper the negotiations between Great Britain and Thailand, although Japan would have to be satisfied with the 30,000 kilotons of rubber which Thailand was reserving for it, and would have to supply the deficiency by increasing the amount from French Indo-China. However, since the British‑Thaiese agreement was to apply for one year only, Japan was to reserve the right to demand Thailand's entire output of rubber and tin in the future. [1169] Tokyo replied that Mr. Futami could handle the matter as he desired, but that Tokyo must have at least 35,000 tons of rubber and at least 6,000 tons of tin. This was to be demanded without any compromise. [1170]
On July 15, 1941 Japan reiterated its demand that she be supplied with rubber and tin in exchange for the oil which Thailand needed. Japan also asked that definite assurance of a change of attitude on the part of the Thaiese government be made, [1171] and that Japan be guaranteed 35,000 tons of rubber and 6,000 tons of tin ore each year.
Pointing out discrepancies in the representations of Nai Wanitto, as compared with Japanese findings in regard to the amounts of tin ore and tin concentrate produced in Thailand, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that an investigation be made. In any event, the Japanese were to demand at least forty per cent of the total amount. [1172]
319. Implementation of French‑Thaiese Treaty.
In answer to an inquiry from Tokyo on July 26, 1941 regarding a recent economic pact between Thailand and France, Minister Futami reported that an agreement, ratified at Saigon on July 19, 1941, was concerned with the circulation of money and the transfer of negotiable documents which had been provided for in the treaty signed in Tokyo between Thailand and French Indo-China. [1173]
320. Japanese Interests in Thailand Affected by American‑British Freezing of Funds.
Another diplomatic economic problem arose for the Japanese with the freezing of their funds in America on July 26, 1941. Regarded merely as an aspect of Thaiese diplomacy, rather than having been prompted by British authorities, was the guarantee of payment which the Thaiese National Bank demanded of the Japanese for shipment of certain materials to England. In case the British bank refused to purchase the material, the Yokohama Specie Bank was to be responsible for payment. [1174]
[1169] II, 1162‑1163.
[1170] II, 1164.
[1171] II, 1165.
[1172] II, 1166.
[1173] II, 1167‑1168.
[1174] II, 1169.
209
On July 28, 1941 Minister Toyoda replied that because of the recent fund‑freezing by England and the United States, he feared that Japan would be unable to purchase Thaiese products either in pounds or dollars. Since the need for Thaiese products was imperative, Thailand was to be asked to accept free yen as a provisional payment until the conclusion of the pending agreement on methods of payment. [1175]
Since the use of free yen might be prohibited, Minister Futami inquired concerning the possibility of bartering with Thailand. [1176] On July 30, 1941 he was instructed by Tokyo to settle for Thaiese goods in gold yen, and he was informed that Japanese proposals for methods of payment would be submitted later. [1177]
According to a report from the Japanese Minister in Bangkok on July 30, 1941, the National Bank of Thailand had disapproved any loans in bahts after the freezing of funds by Britain and the United States. Consequently, the Yokohama Specie Bank had been forced to postpone payment to banks in Hongkong, Shanghai, and other points. Calling on Minister Pibul, Mr. Futami warned that if this state of affairs were not remedied, a cessation of trade between Japan and Thailand would result.
The Japanese Minister reported to Tokyo that Thailand was tending to act in unison with Britain and the United States, and would eventually share in setting up a blockade against Japan. [1178] However, Minister Pibul agreed to a Japanese suggestion that there be an immediate revision of the Thailand currency law and a Japanese‑Thaiese agreement for payments. Stating that the cessation of Japanese‑Thaiese trade relations should be avoided, no matter what Great Britain did, on July 26, 1941 Prime Minister Pibul ordered his Finance Minister to devise a method of solution.
After several conferences with Japanese experts, it was agreed that Thaiese authorities would organize a secret loan association, comprised of three banks, which would grant to the Yokohama Specie Bank a credit amounting to 10,000,000 bahts. [1179] The period of the loan and the interest on it were to be decided on August 1, 1941 by Mon Chao Bibba, advisor to the Thaiese Finance Ministry, and Mr. Yoichi Fukuda, manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. [1180] It appeared, however, that Thailand's Finance Minister had no intention of revising the currency law in carrying out the terms of payment, since he believed that it would be difficult to achieve uniformity of opinion within the Thaiese government,, And revision would require a considerable length of time. [1181]
Another conference on the morning of August 1, 1941 ended inconclusively since an agreement in regard to the rate of interest and a time limit on the loan could not be reached, [1182] but on August 2, 1941 Mr. Futami was able to report that an agreement for credit of 10,000,000 bahts had been reached during the afternoon. [1183]
[1175] II, 1170.
[1176] II, 1171.
[1177] II, 1172.
[1178] II, 1173.
[1179] 10,000,000 bahts was the equivalent at this time of approximately 3,600,000 dollars.
[1180] II, 1174.
[1181] II, 1175.
[1182] II, 1176.
[1183] II, 1177.
210
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
321. Japanese ‑Thaiese Rice Negotiations.
Following the completion of the Japanese‑Thaiese economic treaty, Mr. Rijuta Ono, Japanese financial advisor, informed his Finance Minister in Tokyo that the situation concerning the purchase of Thaiese rice was a bit confused. Since he felt the negotiations should be completed at once, he asked that instructions be sent to him. [1184] However, on the same day Minister Futami advised Tokyo against the sending of a technical expert to look over the rice, rice bran, oil and iron ore situation, since there was now no need to hurry negotiations with Thailand. He promised that Secretary Teiichi Suzuki would amplify this advice on his return to Japan on August 9, 1941. [1185]
322. Thailand Plans to Recognize Manchukuo.
The Japanese Foreign Office reported on July 29, 1941 that Thailand would recognize the Japanese‑sponsored government of Manchukuo on August 1, 1941. [1186] Since this did not take place as planned, Foreign Minister Toyoda, on August 2, 1941, asked that information relating to Thailand's recognition be forwarded from Bangkok. [1187]
Minister Futami replied on August 4, 1941 that recognition was being delayed because of the necessity of obtaining the Emperor's approval. The Ministers of Great Britain and the Netherlands had already asked the Thaiese authorities if there were any truth in newspaper reports concerning the recognition of Manchukuo, and they had been told that Thailand's action was nothing more than a friendly gesture toward Japan. The inquiries of the diplomatic representatives, according to Minister Futami, were not in the form of protests. [1188]
323. Japan Requests a Mutual Exchange of Ambassadors.
As early as June 13, 1941, it had been learned that the Japanese Legation in Thailand was soon to be raised in status to an Embassy. To strengthen the Japanese representation in Thailand, Japan ordered Mr. Ichihashi in London to start for his new post immediately. [1189] In addition, a new Japanese consulate was to be established in Singora, located on the Kra Peninsula near British Malay, for on July 17, 1941 Vice‑Consul Katsuno was instructed to look in Singora for suitable office and residence buildings! [1190]
A Japanese army officer, Major Voshihiko Osone, planned to operate from this consulate under the pseudonym of Saburo Goto, a fourth‑class diplomatic clerk. [1191] Keisuke Ito, a member of the Far Eastern Economic Research Bureau, was also slated to do intelligence work at Singora. [1192]
Since the matter of raising the status of the Thailand Legation to an Embassy was to be approved at the next regular meeting of the Japanese Privy Council, and was to be put into effect immediately thereafter, Mr. Futami was directed on July 3, 1941 to ask Prime Minister Pibul to
[1184] II, 1178.
[1185] II, 1179.
[1186] II, 1180.
[1187] II, 1181.
[1188] II, 1182.
[1189] II, 1183.
[1190] II, 1184.
[1191] II, 1185.
[1192] II, 1186.
211
raise the status of the Thailand Legation in Tokyo to an Embassy at the same time. As soon as the Prime Minister acceded, Mr. Futami was to inform Tokyo immediately. In case of difficulty in finding a suitable ambassador, it was suggested that Thailand appoint its Minister to act as Charge d'Affairs at the same time that the Legation was raised to an Embassy. [1193]
Having already talked with the Prime Minister and having received his approval of the plan, Mr. Futami on July 14, 1941 reported that the Thaiese Departments of the Interior and Foreign Affairs were willing to accept the simultaneous and mutual elevation of Ministries to Embassies through an aide‑memoiré. [1194] On July 23, 1941 Thailand was advised to make the necessary preparations, since the Japanese Privy Council had just approved the raising of the status of the Japanese Legation in Thailand and Japan wished to effect the change immediately. [1195] A week later the appointment as Japanese Ambassador of Mr. Teiji Tsubokami, who had previously been associated with the Foreign Office, was approved by Thailand. 1196
Confidentially informing Minister Futami on August 4, 1941 that the Thaiese were delaying too long in selecting an ambassador, and advising him that Tokyo had postponed the appointment of Ambassador Tsubokami until reciprocal arrangements were made, Mr. Toyoda suggested that the Vice‑Minister of Defense, or some other appropriate person of high repute, be appointed to the Embassy in Japan. [1197] For various reasons, including the opportunity of removing a popular rival of Prime Minister Pibul from Thailand, Foreign Minister Toyoda thought it best to have the Defense Vice Minister sent as the first Thaiese Ambassador to Japan. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that if conditions in Thailand were such that he could not be spared for a long period, the Defense Minister could serve for as little as half a year until a relief could be selected. [1198]
[1193] II, 1187‑1188.
[1194] II, 1189.
[1195] II, 1190.
[1196] II, 1191‑1192.
[1197] II, 1193.
[1198] II, 1194.
212
Mr. Ishizawa again urged Tokyo on August 4, 1941 to buy materials from the Netherlands East Indies with Japanese funds available in Batavia. Since the attitude of the Dutch authorities had grown more hostile toward Japan because of the occupation of French Indo-China and the Japanese threat of moving into Thailand, he reiterated that speedy measures should be taken to procure the immediate export of vital materials. [1132] In view of the fact that the Japanese retaliatory order froze both the funds and the assets of the Netherlands, Mr. Ishizawa expected the Dutch to take even more drastic steps in return. He suggested, therefore, that the guilder funds be released without delay to be applied as payment for exports to Japan. Furthermore, Tokyo was requested to inform Ambassador Pabst that the Japanese order as well as the Netherlands measure, was to freeze only the funds, not the assets, of the other country. [1133] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although the freezing regulations of both countries were comprehensive measures, having no bearing on individual cases, nevertheless, on August 4, 1941 the Netherlands government filed a special request for the transfer of 500,000 yen Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire to the managers of the guild's branches in Japan. In order to preclude the Dutch from retaliating against Japanese banks in the Netherlands Indies, Mr. Ishizawa advised Tokyo to comply with their wishes regarding this transfer. Thus, in the future, when Japan was attempting the conversion of her frozen funds into exportable goods, such action would furnish a precedent for the Netherlands officials. [1134]
[1129] II, 1120.
[1130] II, 1121.
[1131] II, 1122.
[1132] II, Ibid.
[1133] II, 1123.
[1134] II, 1124.
203
PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(k) Japanese‑Thaiese Relations.
300. Japanese Intelligence Reports on Thailand.
On May 23, 1941 Tokyo was informed that Chinese residents in Thailand were still pro-American and pro‑British. For this reason, Mr. Shunsuke Asada, a Japanese Consul General in Bangkok, and the first secretary of the Japanese Legation in Thailand, advised Tokyo to send men acting as business agents, rather than representatives from the Nanking government, on a tour of inspection to win over the Thaiese. [1135]
301. Japan Attempts to Acquire Most of Thailand's Exports.
Since Japan was interested in Thailand's resources, reports in connection with Japan's prospects for acquiring various Thaiese mines were sent to Tokyo. [1136] On June 6, 1941 Mr. Asada suggested that inactive rice refineries belonging to Chinese operators be purchased with the view of forming a guild to secure a comprehensive export permit. This would be a means of reconciling the Chinese dealers in Thailand who would be allowed to do business with Chinese within Japanese occupied territories. [1137]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka on June 9, 1941 inquired as to Thailand's views concerning the subsidizing by Japan of a jointly‑managed Thai‑Japanese company which would ensure regular uninterrupted shipments of tin to Japan. [1138] Mr. Matsuoka was also maneuvering to obtain most of the tin ore mined in Thailand, and, with this in view, was attempting to purchase a two‑months' prospecting contract, with an arrangement that all the tin ore mined during that time would be sent to Japan. [1139]
Since it was necessary that Japan obtain guarantees for three staples, tungsten, tin, and rubber, Mr. Asada suggested on June 6, 1941 that the Mitsui organization, which was currently negotiating for the purchase of tin mines in Thailand, be encouraged by the Foreign Office to obtain an option for these mines. [1140]
302. Japan Sends Oil Experts to Thailand in Guise of Diplomats.
To investigate the current consumption of petroleum in Thailand, a member of the Japanese Government Planning Board, Juro Suzuki, and an official of the Fuel Bureau, Yosio Yosida, were sent in early June, 1941 to Bangkok with the official titles of Foreign Office Secretary and General Affairs Official. These men were also to instruct secretly other Japanese in the methods of petroleum consumption. However, Japan was uncertain as to Thailand's reception of its "experts" and directed Mr. Yasusato Futami, Japanese Minister to Thailand, to sound out Thaiese officials in this matter. [1141]
[1135] II, 1125.
[1136] II, 1126.
[1137] II, 1127.
[1138] II, 1128.
[1139] II, 1129.
[1140] II, 1130‑1131.
[1141] II, 1132.
204
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
303. Japanese‑Thaiese Petroleum Negotiations.
As for petroleum, on June 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed to supply the amount needed by Thailand, but declared that in the future Japan would demand the entire amount of Thaiese rubber and tin. Japan would agree to British‑Thailand petroleum negotiations only if these were on a small scale, and if Thailand would furnish Japan with as much as possible of 15,000 tons of tin ore a year. It was Japan's intention at this time to secure forty per cent of Thailand's tin production, and eventually the entire output. The amount of petroleum to be supplied by Japan for the month of June, 1941 would be decided later in view of the British. [1142]
304. Britain Supplies Oil to Thailand.
It was confidentially reported to Tokyo on June 6, 1941 that Great Britain had decided to furnish 6,000 tons of petroleum to Thailand. [1143] However, since business was suspended at this time, the British supply would be accepted by the Asia Petroleum Company and later reloaded. [1144]
Despite a Japanese decision that all matters pertaining to the supplying of petroleum to Thailand should be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, Mr. Matsuoka informed Minister Futami that Thailand had submitted a request to the Japanese navy for 12,000 tons of crude oil. The Thaiese government was to be advised that such requests, when not submitted to the Foreign Office, would not be considered by Japan. [1145]
305. Japan Mediates a Thailand‑French Indo-China Dispute.
In January, 1941 Japan had offered to mediate hostilities between Thailand and French Indo-China concerning the cessation of border territories, which Thailand had demanded. After several prolongations of the armistice, an agreement was signed in Tokyo on March 11, 1941, and later a treaty and two protocols were drafted. France was to cede some 25,000 miles of territory in French Indo-China, including the districts of Paklay and Bassac, and a large part of Cambodia, which were to be demilitarized.
During the negotiations for the ratification of the treaty, Japan asked on June 13, 1941 that Luang Songram Pibul, Prime Minister of Thailand, send Nai Pananow Wanitto, Chief of the Thaiese Trade Bureau, to Japan to assist the Foreign Office. [1146] As soon as Mr. Andre Roban, the French Plenipotentiary in French Indo-China, returned to his post, proceedings were to begin, [1147] since Thailand was anxious to have the ratification take place by June 27, 1941 at the very latest. [1148] The mediation treaty was to be presented to the Japanese Privy Council in Tokyo on June 18, 1941. Eventually, the Thailand‑French Indo-China treaty was signed on June 21, 1941 and the exchange of official documents was scheduled to take place on July 1, 1941. [1149]
[1142] II, 1130‑1131.
[1143] II, 1133.
[1144] II, 1134.
[1145] II, 1135.
[1146] II, 1136.
[1147] II, 1137.
[1148] II, 1138.
[1149] II, 1139.
205
306. Thailand Desires Continuation of Japanese Pressure on French Indo-China.
In a conversation with Mr. Futami a few days before the ratification by the French took place, Minister Pibul of Thailand had remarked that he would like to ascertain the Japanese attitude toward French Indo-China. Though he had assured the Prime Minister that there would be no change in the future policy of the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister believed that Mr. Pibul still was concerned lest Japan would weaken in exerting pressure on French Indo-China, and especially in its independent attitude toward Britain. However, on July 11, 1941 Mr. Futami informed Tokyo that the Prime Minister of Thailand, in a conversation with the Italian Minister, had raised a question as to why Japan did not advance to the north, since the pressure on the south had been alleviated. [1150]
307. Details of Japanese‑Thaiese Agreement.
Mr. Futami also reported that both Ambassador Hajime Matsumiya's proposal regarding political and economical cooperation between Japan and Thailand, and the understanding between Itaro Mizuno, of the Commercial Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and Nai Wanitto, Acting Minister of Finance of Thailand, urged that economic problems be submitted for consideration by the various firms engaged in the business concerned. However, political problems still seemed to be under the jurisdiction of Nai Wanitto. [1151]
308. Japanese Interest in Survey of Thailand's Border.
On June 20, 1941 Mr. Futami inquired of Tokyo regarding the organization by Thailand of five scientific groups, two of which were being formed for land survey, one for meteorological observation, and two for surveying the Mekong and Mei Rivers. Suggesting an increase in Japanese representation in the groups, Mr. Futami asked for a declaration of policy in order that he might negotiate the matter with the Thaiese government. [1152]
309. Japanese Propaganda Activities in Thailand.
Plans were under way to establish a Japanese printing office in Bangkok, [1153] and 4,400 baht (Thaiese monetary unit) had been appropriated from secret intelligence funds for purchasing the Bangkok Chronicle. [1154] The proposed visit of the editor of the Bangkok Chronicle to Japan was viewed with suspicion by Minister Futami in a report of July 3, 1941, since the Japanese Minister felt that the editor was making the trip to collect information for the local British Minister from whom he had received 5,000 bahts. While admitting that the accuracy of this report was questionable, Minister Futami advised that great care should be exercised. [1155]
As to the purchase of the Bangkok Chronicle, Mr. Futami pointed out that the paper had only a very small circulation and not much influence among the Thaiese. As an organ of propaganda, the paper's effectiveness was uncertain. Furthermore, it would be necessary to study carefully the means and methods of controlling the news in the paper as well as supervising its editorial policy. [1156]
[1150] II, 1140.
[1151] II, 1141‑1142.
[1152] II, 1143.
[1153] II, 1144.
[1154] II, 1145‑1146.
[1155] II, 1147.
[1156] II, 1148.
206
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
310. British Opposition to Japanese Control of Thailand's Exports.
In a dispatch to Tokyo on June 23, 1941 Mr. Futami revealed that the British had suggested to Thailand that the amount of rubber to be furnished to Japan should be reduced to 25,000 tons a year. Although he had no intention of considering this proposal, Prime Minister Pibul had asked Minister Futami whether the Japanese government could be satisfied with 35,000 tons yearly.
Mr. Wanitto informed the Japanese Minister on June 21, 1941 that the British had no objection to Japan's having up to 2,000 tons of tin ore, to which Mr. Futami had replied that this would not be half the amount which Japan needed. Reference was also made at this time to the establishment of tin refining plants, but there was no indication of Thailand's making any definite proposal. Mr. Wanitto pointed out that, considering the nature of the tin industry in Thailand and the fact that the ore was secured from tin mines affiliated with British capital, there would be opposition to a joint Japanese‑Thaiese organization. [1157] Reports concerning the purchases of Thailand rubber by Germany, Britain and the United States continued to disturb Tokyo which desired these exports for its own use. [1158]
311. Estimated Value of Japanese‑Thaiese Exports.
Referring to previous Japanese‑Thaiese economic agreements, Mr. Futami estimated that according to the Japanese plan, Japanese products worth 130,000,000 yen would be exported to Thailand whereas Thailand's exports to Japan would reach the enormous sum of 208,000,000 yen. In view of this prospective unfavorable balance of trade, the Japanese Minister advised that Tokyo consider carefully how Japan would pay for all of these products. [1159]
312. British‑Thaiese Economic Agreement.
A resume of the prospective British‑Thailand agreement was sent to Tokyo on July 14, 1941. The minimum quantity of rubber to be sent to England was 18,000 tons, and although up to 30,000 tons in addition could be supplied, in no event was a total of 48,000 tons to be exceeded. In return, the Thailand government agreed not to use for re‑exportation any of the petroleum furnished by Britain. [1160] Although Britain had requested the Thailand government to withdraw the currency it now had in America, no definite conclusion had been reached.
313. Japan Fears British Influence in Thailand.
Although at the time of the Wanitto conversations in Tokyo, the Thaiese people had started celebrations and demonstrations, Minister Futami reported on July 12, 1941 that this excitement had abated. Because of the resumption of relations with Great Britain, Japan feared that Thailand would revive her principle of good will for all nations, and as a result, the relations between Japan and Thailand would suffer a setback. Mr. Futami pointed out that when Mr. Wanitto had first returned from Tokyo, Thaiese authorities had expected Japan to seize Singapore in the near future. But since that time, Thailand's offer of rubber to Japan had decreased in size from 38,400 tons to 30,000. [1161]
[1157] II, 1142.
[1158] II, 1149‑1151.
[1159] II, 1152.
[1160] II, 1153.
[1161] II, 1154.
207
314. American ‑Thaiese Proposals.
Minister Futami reported that Thailand had proposed to America that payment for its orders for several American‑made freighters and bombers, as well as the oil purchased from Britain, be made from funds Thailand had in America. In considering this proposal, the American government had in turn requested that Thailand not exclude Christianity, form no secret foreign trade agreement with a third country, and exchange intelligence with the United States. However, the American request had not been accepted by July 15, 1941. [1162]
315. Japan Plans to Offset British Influence.
Fearing that Thailand might resume her talks with Great Britain, Japan proposed to organize immediately a Japanese‑Thaiese commission. Mr. Futami was asked on July 16, 1941 to negotiate personally with Mr. Pibul with the view of working out a prospectus for joint Japanese‑Thaiese rights and interests. The Japanese commission was to consist of Mr. Futami as Chairman, the Military and Naval Attaches, and two first‑class diplomatic secretaries. Tokyo requested that Minister Pibul be made the chief Thailand negotiator, or that someone else amenable to Japanese influence be appointed. [1163]
316. Japan Expands Its Communications System in Thailand.
In conjunction with the Japanese policy of preparing communications facilities for use in case of emergency, Japanese representatives inquired on May 16, 1941 concerning the possibility of placing a radio transmitter in the consulate at Singora, [1164] but Tokyo decided at this time that the establishment of two‑way radio communication with Canton was impracticable from the viewpoint of secrecy. [1165] However, on July 21, 1941 negotiations for the expansion of Japanese communication were under way with the Thailand Communications Bureau. [1166]
317. Japan Informs Thailand of the Japanese‑French Agreement.
Realizing that Thailand would be concerned as to the purpose of the Japanese‑French Joint Agreement, Japan informed its Minister at Bangkok concerning the negotiations at Vichy. Prime Minister Pibul was to be informed of the agreement at 6:00 P.M. on July 24, 1941, two days prior to the publication of a statement announcing the agreement on July 26, 1941.
Because the people of Thailand would be very much affected by the publishing of the Japanese-French Joint Agreement, Japan felt that the significance of the pact should be minimized as much as possible by Prime Minister Pibul, who was to be assured that the joint understanding was not aimed at Thailand, and that the traditional friendship between Bangkok and Tokyo would not be affected. Furthermore, Japan had not lost its eagerness to cooperate in the economic development of Thailand, for it was giving Mr. Pibul advance information concerning the Japanese‑French Agreement as an indication of the intimacy of Japanese‑Thaiese relations. [1167]
According to Mr. Futami's report of his interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Pibul expressed his deep appreciation at being privately informed of the Japanese‑French Agreement, which was acceptable to him, but had showed no surprise upon hearing the news. [1168]
[1162] II, 1155.
[1163] II, 1156.
[1164] II, 1157.
[1165] II, 1158.
[1166] II, 1159.
[1167] II, 1160.
[1168] II, 1161.
208
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
318. Japan Decides Not to Stop British‑Thaiese Agreement.
On July 26, 1941 it was learned that Britain had agreed to supply Thailand with petroleum in return for rubber, tin, and other products, and, thus, Japan's demands upon Thailand could not be carried out. If Japan insisted on the accomplishment of her original demands, however, it would be impossible for the British‑Thaiese negotiations to go through, and this would result in Thailand's calling on Japan for all of her requirements. For this reason Minister Futami thought it advisable not to hamper the negotiations between Great Britain and Thailand, although Japan would have to be satisfied with the 30,000 kilotons of rubber which Thailand was reserving for it, and would have to supply the deficiency by increasing the amount from French Indo-China. However, since the British‑Thaiese agreement was to apply for one year only, Japan was to reserve the right to demand Thailand's entire output of rubber and tin in the future. [1169] Tokyo replied that Mr. Futami could handle the matter as he desired, but that Tokyo must have at least 35,000 tons of rubber and at least 6,000 tons of tin. This was to be demanded without any compromise. [1170]
On July 15, 1941 Japan reiterated its demand that she be supplied with rubber and tin in exchange for the oil which Thailand needed. Japan also asked that definite assurance of a change of attitude on the part of the Thaiese government be made, [1171] and that Japan be guaranteed 35,000 tons of rubber and 6,000 tons of tin ore each year.
Pointing out discrepancies in the representations of Nai Wanitto, as compared with Japanese findings in regard to the amounts of tin ore and tin concentrate produced in Thailand, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that an investigation be made. In any event, the Japanese were to demand at least forty per cent of the total amount. [1172]
319. Implementation of French‑Thaiese Treaty.
In answer to an inquiry from Tokyo on July 26, 1941 regarding a recent economic pact between Thailand and France, Minister Futami reported that an agreement, ratified at Saigon on July 19, 1941, was concerned with the circulation of money and the transfer of negotiable documents which had been provided for in the treaty signed in Tokyo between Thailand and French Indo-China. [1173]
320. Japanese Interests in Thailand Affected by American‑British Freezing of Funds.
Another diplomatic economic problem arose for the Japanese with the freezing of their funds in America on July 26, 1941. Regarded merely as an aspect of Thaiese diplomacy, rather than having been prompted by British authorities, was the guarantee of payment which the Thaiese National Bank demanded of the Japanese for shipment of certain materials to England. In case the British bank refused to purchase the material, the Yokohama Specie Bank was to be responsible for payment. [1174]
[1169] II, 1162‑1163.
[1170] II, 1164.
[1171] II, 1165.
[1172] II, 1166.
[1173] II, 1167‑1168.
[1174] II, 1169.
209
On July 28, 1941 Minister Toyoda replied that because of the recent fund‑freezing by England and the United States, he feared that Japan would be unable to purchase Thaiese products either in pounds or dollars. Since the need for Thaiese products was imperative, Thailand was to be asked to accept free yen as a provisional payment until the conclusion of the pending agreement on methods of payment. [1175]
Since the use of free yen might be prohibited, Minister Futami inquired concerning the possibility of bartering with Thailand. [1176] On July 30, 1941 he was instructed by Tokyo to settle for Thaiese goods in gold yen, and he was informed that Japanese proposals for methods of payment would be submitted later. [1177]
According to a report from the Japanese Minister in Bangkok on July 30, 1941, the National Bank of Thailand had disapproved any loans in bahts after the freezing of funds by Britain and the United States. Consequently, the Yokohama Specie Bank had been forced to postpone payment to banks in Hongkong, Shanghai, and other points. Calling on Minister Pibul, Mr. Futami warned that if this state of affairs were not remedied, a cessation of trade between Japan and Thailand would result.
The Japanese Minister reported to Tokyo that Thailand was tending to act in unison with Britain and the United States, and would eventually share in setting up a blockade against Japan. [1178] However, Minister Pibul agreed to a Japanese suggestion that there be an immediate revision of the Thailand currency law and a Japanese‑Thaiese agreement for payments. Stating that the cessation of Japanese‑Thaiese trade relations should be avoided, no matter what Great Britain did, on July 26, 1941 Prime Minister Pibul ordered his Finance Minister to devise a method of solution.
After several conferences with Japanese experts, it was agreed that Thaiese authorities would organize a secret loan association, comprised of three banks, which would grant to the Yokohama Specie Bank a credit amounting to 10,000,000 bahts. [1179] The period of the loan and the interest on it were to be decided on August 1, 1941 by Mon Chao Bibba, advisor to the Thaiese Finance Ministry, and Mr. Yoichi Fukuda, manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. [1180] It appeared, however, that Thailand's Finance Minister had no intention of revising the currency law in carrying out the terms of payment, since he believed that it would be difficult to achieve uniformity of opinion within the Thaiese government,, And revision would require a considerable length of time. [1181]
Another conference on the morning of August 1, 1941 ended inconclusively since an agreement in regard to the rate of interest and a time limit on the loan could not be reached, [1182] but on August 2, 1941 Mr. Futami was able to report that an agreement for credit of 10,000,000 bahts had been reached during the afternoon. [1183]
[1175] II, 1170.
[1176] II, 1171.
[1177] II, 1172.
[1178] II, 1173.
[1179] 10,000,000 bahts was the equivalent at this time of approximately 3,600,000 dollars.
[1180] II, 1174.
[1181] II, 1175.
[1182] II, 1176.
[1183] II, 1177.
210
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
321. Japanese ‑Thaiese Rice Negotiations.
Following the completion of the Japanese‑Thaiese economic treaty, Mr. Rijuta Ono, Japanese financial advisor, informed his Finance Minister in Tokyo that the situation concerning the purchase of Thaiese rice was a bit confused. Since he felt the negotiations should be completed at once, he asked that instructions be sent to him. [1184] However, on the same day Minister Futami advised Tokyo against the sending of a technical expert to look over the rice, rice bran, oil and iron ore situation, since there was now no need to hurry negotiations with Thailand. He promised that Secretary Teiichi Suzuki would amplify this advice on his return to Japan on August 9, 1941. [1185]
322. Thailand Plans to Recognize Manchukuo.
The Japanese Foreign Office reported on July 29, 1941 that Thailand would recognize the Japanese‑sponsored government of Manchukuo on August 1, 1941. [1186] Since this did not take place as planned, Foreign Minister Toyoda, on August 2, 1941, asked that information relating to Thailand's recognition be forwarded from Bangkok. [1187]
Minister Futami replied on August 4, 1941 that recognition was being delayed because of the necessity of obtaining the Emperor's approval. The Ministers of Great Britain and the Netherlands had already asked the Thaiese authorities if there were any truth in newspaper reports concerning the recognition of Manchukuo, and they had been told that Thailand's action was nothing more than a friendly gesture toward Japan. The inquiries of the diplomatic representatives, according to Minister Futami, were not in the form of protests. [1188]
323. Japan Requests a Mutual Exchange of Ambassadors.
As early as June 13, 1941, it had been learned that the Japanese Legation in Thailand was soon to be raised in status to an Embassy. To strengthen the Japanese representation in Thailand, Japan ordered Mr. Ichihashi in London to start for his new post immediately. [1189] In addition, a new Japanese consulate was to be established in Singora, located on the Kra Peninsula near British Malay, for on July 17, 1941 Vice‑Consul Katsuno was instructed to look in Singora for suitable office and residence buildings! [1190]
A Japanese army officer, Major Voshihiko Osone, planned to operate from this consulate under the pseudonym of Saburo Goto, a fourth‑class diplomatic clerk. [1191] Keisuke Ito, a member of the Far Eastern Economic Research Bureau, was also slated to do intelligence work at Singora. [1192]
Since the matter of raising the status of the Thailand Legation to an Embassy was to be approved at the next regular meeting of the Japanese Privy Council, and was to be put into effect immediately thereafter, Mr. Futami was directed on July 3, 1941 to ask Prime Minister Pibul to
[1184] II, 1178.
[1185] II, 1179.
[1186] II, 1180.
[1187] II, 1181.
[1188] II, 1182.
[1189] II, 1183.
[1190] II, 1184.
[1191] II, 1185.
[1192] II, 1186.
211
raise the status of the Thailand Legation in Tokyo to an Embassy at the same time. As soon as the Prime Minister acceded, Mr. Futami was to inform Tokyo immediately. In case of difficulty in finding a suitable ambassador, it was suggested that Thailand appoint its Minister to act as Charge d'Affairs at the same time that the Legation was raised to an Embassy. [1193]
Having already talked with the Prime Minister and having received his approval of the plan, Mr. Futami on July 14, 1941 reported that the Thaiese Departments of the Interior and Foreign Affairs were willing to accept the simultaneous and mutual elevation of Ministries to Embassies through an aide‑memoiré. [1194] On July 23, 1941 Thailand was advised to make the necessary preparations, since the Japanese Privy Council had just approved the raising of the status of the Japanese Legation in Thailand and Japan wished to effect the change immediately. [1195] A week later the appointment as Japanese Ambassador of Mr. Teiji Tsubokami, who had previously been associated with the Foreign Office, was approved by Thailand. 1196
Confidentially informing Minister Futami on August 4, 1941 that the Thaiese were delaying too long in selecting an ambassador, and advising him that Tokyo had postponed the appointment of Ambassador Tsubokami until reciprocal arrangements were made, Mr. Toyoda suggested that the Vice‑Minister of Defense, or some other appropriate person of high repute, be appointed to the Embassy in Japan. [1197] For various reasons, including the opportunity of removing a popular rival of Prime Minister Pibul from Thailand, Foreign Minister Toyoda thought it best to have the Defense Vice Minister sent as the first Thaiese Ambassador to Japan. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that if conditions in Thailand were such that he could not be spared for a long period, the Defense Minister could serve for as little as half a year until a relief could be selected. [1198]
[1193] II, 1187‑1188.
[1194] II, 1189.
[1195] II, 1190.
[1196] II, 1191‑1192.
[1197] II, 1193.
[1198] II, 1194.
212
Monday, May 25, 2009
pill 3.pil.55519 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Using viruses to deliver DNA into cells is a common technique in gene therapy, but it risks triggering cancerous mutations. Instead, the researchers developed a new gene-delivery method that bundles the ring of DNA inside microscopic spheres made of a material called chitosan, which is extracted from shrimp shells.
These spheres, each about 100 nanometers across, also contain a second ring of DNA encoding a gene that controls where along the animals' chromosomes the insulin gene gets inserted. Previous research by Michèle Pamela Calos of Stanford University and her colleagues showed that none of the 370 possible insertion points trigger cancer.
Rather than injecting a dose of these microscopic spheres into the bloodstream, Cheung's team sprayed the spheres directly onto the gut lining using a modified endoscope, a tube-shaped tool that doctors use to look down a person's throat at their intestines. That way, the spheres only get absorbed by cells of the gut lining.
Cheung says that it might also be possible for patients to ingest the spheres in a drink or a pill.
In the experiments, the genetically altered K cells responded when the animals ate sugar by producing insulin with the same timing as a healthy pancreas. The K cells performed the new task for about five months. Because cells of the gut lining are constantly replaced, the treatment would have to be reapplied periodically, Cheung says.
Previous work by Cheung and his colleagues showed that mice engineered to have the altered K cells from birth remained alive and healthy after the insulin-producing beta cells of the pancreas had been destroyed. In separate experiments using mice with a juvenile diabetes–like condition in which beta cells are attacked by the animals' immune systems, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire K cells were not attacked even when altered to produce insulin.
The team has begun testing the technique on pigs, whose intestines are very similar to human intestines.
These spheres, each about 100 nanometers across, also contain a second ring of DNA encoding a gene that controls where along the animals' chromosomes the insulin gene gets inserted. Previous research by Michèle Pamela Calos of Stanford University and her colleagues showed that none of the 370 possible insertion points trigger cancer.
Rather than injecting a dose of these microscopic spheres into the bloodstream, Cheung's team sprayed the spheres directly onto the gut lining using a modified endoscope, a tube-shaped tool that doctors use to look down a person's throat at their intestines. That way, the spheres only get absorbed by cells of the gut lining.
Cheung says that it might also be possible for patients to ingest the spheres in a drink or a pill.
In the experiments, the genetically altered K cells responded when the animals ate sugar by producing insulin with the same timing as a healthy pancreas. The K cells performed the new task for about five months. Because cells of the gut lining are constantly replaced, the treatment would have to be reapplied periodically, Cheung says.
Previous work by Cheung and his colleagues showed that mice engineered to have the altered K cells from birth remained alive and healthy after the insulin-producing beta cells of the pancreas had been destroyed. In separate experiments using mice with a juvenile diabetes–like condition in which beta cells are attacked by the animals' immune systems, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire K cells were not attacked even when altered to produce insulin.
The team has begun testing the technique on pigs, whose intestines are very similar to human intestines.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
snag 9.sna.001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Cholesterol-reducing drugs called statins do their job with remarkable efficiency, but in rare individuals they can cause a painful muscle side effect called myopathy. Researchers report in an upcoming issue of the New England Journal of Medicine the discovery of a gene variant that places people at risk of this complication.
The gene, called SLCO1B1, encodes a protein that shuttles compounds from the blood stream into the liver for processing. This cargo includes statins.
Properly deposited, these drugs then go on to decrease the levels of LDL, the bad cholesterol.
But people with the variant form of the gene make a version of this protein that transports statins poorly, leaving an excess amount in the blood stream, says study coauthor Rory Collins, a physician and epidemiologist at the University of Oxford in England.
From there the story gets rather mysterious. “It’s still not clear how statins cause myopathy,” he says. But left to linger in the blood, statins seem to have that effect. “The mechanism is unknown.”
Collins and his colleagues suspected that statins were involved because a trial had shown that people getting high doses of a statin were 10 times as likely to develop the side effect as people receiving a low dose, Collins says. But since not everyone gets myopathy on high-dose statins, the scientists guessed that a gene — or a rogue form of one — might explain some of the risk.
Blood samples were collected from 192 of the trial volunteers between 1998 and 2001. Half the volunteers had myopathy, half did not. The statin used in the trial was simvastatin, marketed as Zocor. The scientists screened thousands of genes in these blood samples, and the one that stood out was SLCO1B1.
Genes often come in a variety of forms, resulting in the assemblage of slightly different proteins. The researchers found that among people taking high-dose simvastatin, those who carried one particular variant of the SLCO1B1 gene had four times the risk of myopathy compared with people carrying other forms of SLCO1B1. If a person carried two copies of this variant — one inherited from each parent — the risk shot up 17-fold, the researchers report.
“We’ve always suspected there are genetic differences,” says endocrinologist Robert Hegele of the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario “It’s great that they did this study.”
Hegele estimates that roughly five to 10 percent of patients on statins report some muscle aches and pains at some point.
Collins and his team calculated that 18 percent of people with two copies of the gene variant who take a high does of statins would develop myopathy, while three percent of people who harbor only one copy and take the high drug dose would get myopathy.
Severe myopathy can damage muscles and even the kidneys. The researchers calculated that nearly two-thirds of the cases of myopathy in patients taking high-dose statins are attributable to the variant.
Doctors might avoid giving statins to people who have two copies of the variant and prescribe only low-dose statins for people carrying one copy, reasons physician Yusuke Nakamura of the University of Tokyo, writing in the same NEJM issue.
As an alternative, doctors might use the anti-cholesterol drug ezetimibe, sold as Zetia, which lowers LDL via a mechanism different from that employed by statins, Hegele says. Statins reduce cholesterol production in the liver, whereas Zetia inhibits cholesterol absorption in the intestines.
While doctors’ offices aren’t equipped to test for the gene, Collins says, the actual lab test for the variant is inexpensive. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire “The technology is straightforward. It would cost less than a dollar in a standard genetics lab,” he says.
The number of people in the United States taking statins nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005, rising from 15.8 million to 29.7 million, according to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey conducted by the federal government.
The gene, called SLCO1B1, encodes a protein that shuttles compounds from the blood stream into the liver for processing. This cargo includes statins.
Properly deposited, these drugs then go on to decrease the levels of LDL, the bad cholesterol.
But people with the variant form of the gene make a version of this protein that transports statins poorly, leaving an excess amount in the blood stream, says study coauthor Rory Collins, a physician and epidemiologist at the University of Oxford in England.
From there the story gets rather mysterious. “It’s still not clear how statins cause myopathy,” he says. But left to linger in the blood, statins seem to have that effect. “The mechanism is unknown.”
Collins and his colleagues suspected that statins were involved because a trial had shown that people getting high doses of a statin were 10 times as likely to develop the side effect as people receiving a low dose, Collins says. But since not everyone gets myopathy on high-dose statins, the scientists guessed that a gene — or a rogue form of one — might explain some of the risk.
Blood samples were collected from 192 of the trial volunteers between 1998 and 2001. Half the volunteers had myopathy, half did not. The statin used in the trial was simvastatin, marketed as Zocor. The scientists screened thousands of genes in these blood samples, and the one that stood out was SLCO1B1.
Genes often come in a variety of forms, resulting in the assemblage of slightly different proteins. The researchers found that among people taking high-dose simvastatin, those who carried one particular variant of the SLCO1B1 gene had four times the risk of myopathy compared with people carrying other forms of SLCO1B1. If a person carried two copies of this variant — one inherited from each parent — the risk shot up 17-fold, the researchers report.
“We’ve always suspected there are genetic differences,” says endocrinologist Robert Hegele of the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario “It’s great that they did this study.”
Hegele estimates that roughly five to 10 percent of patients on statins report some muscle aches and pains at some point.
Collins and his team calculated that 18 percent of people with two copies of the gene variant who take a high does of statins would develop myopathy, while three percent of people who harbor only one copy and take the high drug dose would get myopathy.
Severe myopathy can damage muscles and even the kidneys. The researchers calculated that nearly two-thirds of the cases of myopathy in patients taking high-dose statins are attributable to the variant.
Doctors might avoid giving statins to people who have two copies of the variant and prescribe only low-dose statins for people carrying one copy, reasons physician Yusuke Nakamura of the University of Tokyo, writing in the same NEJM issue.
As an alternative, doctors might use the anti-cholesterol drug ezetimibe, sold as Zetia, which lowers LDL via a mechanism different from that employed by statins, Hegele says. Statins reduce cholesterol production in the liver, whereas Zetia inhibits cholesterol absorption in the intestines.
While doctors’ offices aren’t equipped to test for the gene, Collins says, the actual lab test for the variant is inexpensive. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire “The technology is straightforward. It would cost less than a dollar in a standard genetics lab,” he says.
The number of people in the United States taking statins nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005, rising from 15.8 million to 29.7 million, according to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey conducted by the federal government.
Saturday, May 2, 2009
team 3.tea.o Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
It’s a case of mind over muscle, by way of machine. By electronically connecting a monkey’s forearm muscles to its brain, researchers gave a temporarily paralyzed monkey the ability to clench those muscles. http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us
An electrode implanted in the monkey’s brain picked up the electrical signal from a single neuron, and the monkey learned to control the activity of that neuron to regain control of its wrist — even if the neuron was in a sensory rather than a muscle-controlling region of the brain.
It’s a powerful demonstration of the brain’s flexibility, and the first time that scientists have electronically linked a single neuron to an animal’s own muscles, researchers report in the Oct. 16 Nature.
Such an artificial connection could replace the electrical signals that nerves normally carry to muscles, but that, in people with paralysis, are blocked, the researchers suggest.
“We were interested in developing a potential treatment for paralysis, whether it’s from spinal cord injury or other injury,” says study coauthor Chet Moritz of the Washington National Primate Research Center in Seattle. The current experiment is only meant to show that such an electronic connection is possible, Moritz adds. More work is needed before the technology could be ready for use in people. "We are several years away if not several decades away."
But some scientists are skeptical of whether the new technique will ever be well suited for restoring motion in paralysis patients. In the experiments, the monkey only had to learn to control two muscles, which pushed and pulled its wrist in a motion like revving a motorcycle. Its arm was otherwise braced and immobilized.
In more natural situations, even simple motions require the coordinated control of a dozen or more muscles. Reach forward to press a button, and muscles in your torso, back, shoulder, upper arm, forearm and hand will all contract in concert.
With the approach from Moritz’s team, a patient would have to learn to control each muscle separately, and then consciously coordinate perhaps 20 or so muscles to achieve even one simple task. “That to me would be extremely complex and probably very difficult to train a subject to do,” comments Andrew Schwartz, a neurobiologist at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania.
Schwartz has previously connected a monkey’s brain to a robotic arm using a different technique that gave the monkey control over its arm that was more complex.
Schwartz’s team first watched the monkey’s brain activity while it used its own arm in a natural way. Decoding this neural activity allowed the researchers to later wire the monkey’s brain to a robotic arm that would adapt to the monkey, instead of making the monkey adapt to it. That way, the monkey could simply “will” the movement to happen without having to concentrate on contracting individual muscles.
All this decoding of brain impulses takes the computing horsepower of a modern desktop computer, though. The advantage of Moritz’s approach is that the signal from a single neuron can be interpreted by a much less powerful computer chip, perhaps one small and low-powered enough to implant into the animal’s — or a patient’s — body. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moritz also suggests that his team’s approach could eventually control several muscles at once by electrically stimulating nerves in the spinal cord, rather than stimulating the muscles directly. Eventually the researchers hope to develop wireless electrodes that wouldn’t involve wires sticking out of the skull, Moritz says.
An electrode implanted in the monkey’s brain picked up the electrical signal from a single neuron, and the monkey learned to control the activity of that neuron to regain control of its wrist — even if the neuron was in a sensory rather than a muscle-controlling region of the brain.
It’s a powerful demonstration of the brain’s flexibility, and the first time that scientists have electronically linked a single neuron to an animal’s own muscles, researchers report in the Oct. 16 Nature.
Such an artificial connection could replace the electrical signals that nerves normally carry to muscles, but that, in people with paralysis, are blocked, the researchers suggest.
“We were interested in developing a potential treatment for paralysis, whether it’s from spinal cord injury or other injury,” says study coauthor Chet Moritz of the Washington National Primate Research Center in Seattle. The current experiment is only meant to show that such an electronic connection is possible, Moritz adds. More work is needed before the technology could be ready for use in people. "We are several years away if not several decades away."
But some scientists are skeptical of whether the new technique will ever be well suited for restoring motion in paralysis patients. In the experiments, the monkey only had to learn to control two muscles, which pushed and pulled its wrist in a motion like revving a motorcycle. Its arm was otherwise braced and immobilized.
In more natural situations, even simple motions require the coordinated control of a dozen or more muscles. Reach forward to press a button, and muscles in your torso, back, shoulder, upper arm, forearm and hand will all contract in concert.
With the approach from Moritz’s team, a patient would have to learn to control each muscle separately, and then consciously coordinate perhaps 20 or so muscles to achieve even one simple task. “That to me would be extremely complex and probably very difficult to train a subject to do,” comments Andrew Schwartz, a neurobiologist at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania.
Schwartz has previously connected a monkey’s brain to a robotic arm using a different technique that gave the monkey control over its arm that was more complex.
Schwartz’s team first watched the monkey’s brain activity while it used its own arm in a natural way. Decoding this neural activity allowed the researchers to later wire the monkey’s brain to a robotic arm that would adapt to the monkey, instead of making the monkey adapt to it. That way, the monkey could simply “will” the movement to happen without having to concentrate on contracting individual muscles.
All this decoding of brain impulses takes the computing horsepower of a modern desktop computer, though. The advantage of Moritz’s approach is that the signal from a single neuron can be interpreted by a much less powerful computer chip, perhaps one small and low-powered enough to implant into the animal’s — or a patient’s — body. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Moritz also suggests that his team’s approach could eventually control several muscles at once by electrically stimulating nerves in the spinal cord, rather than stimulating the muscles directly. Eventually the researchers hope to develop wireless electrodes that wouldn’t involve wires sticking out of the skull, Moritz says.
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